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ANTITRUST-Boycotts--A Boycott with a Noncommercial Pur-
pose Is Not Regulable Under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mis-
souri v. National Organizationfor Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir. 1980).
In Missouri v. National Organizationfor Women, I the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision
2
allowing supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment3 (ERA), with-
out violating Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
4 to boycott5
states that had not ratified the ERA. In deciding the federal antitrust
question the court limited the application of the rule declaring boy-
cotts illegalper se to a commercial context, and granted noncommer-
cial boycotts an exemption from the strictures of the Sherman Act
because non-commercial boycotts are not motivated by anticompeti-
tive purposes. The court also took pendent jurisdiction6 over two
state claims, determining that a noncommercial7 boycott was privi-
1. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. July 8,
1980) (No. 79-2037).
2. 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
3. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment was adopted by Congress in H.R.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) and provides as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
4. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5. A colorful explanation of the word "boycott" is found in State v. Glidden, 55 Conn.
46, 76-7, 8 A. 890, 896-97 (1887):
Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne .... In his capacity as
agent he had served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenantry suddenly
retaliated. . . . The population of the region for miles around resolved not to have
anything to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent it, not to allow anyone else
to have anything to do with him. ... His servants fled from him as servants flee
from their masters in some plague-stricken Italian city. .. . He and his wife had to
work their own fields in a most unpleasant imitation of Theocritan shepherds and
shepherdesses.
6. If a plaintiff brings a substantial federal claim, the federal court may take pendent
jurisdiction over any state claims that arise from the same set of facts as the federal claim,
especially if the claims are such that they would ordinarily be tried in one proceeding. The
exercise of the power is governed by considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness to litigants. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 1965).
For a discussion of the development of the concept of pendent jurisdiction, see Note, UMW Y.
Gibbs and Pendent Jurdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, Pendent Jusdictionr An
Expanding Concept in Federal Court Jurirdiction, 51 IowA L. REV. 151 (1965).
7. Throughout Justice Stephenson's majority opinion and this case note, the terms
"commercial" and "noncommercial" are used as they were defined by Professor Coons:
leged against charges of tortious infliction of economic harm8 and
was not a violation of Missouri's antitrust law.9
The National Organization for Women (NOW) I° resolved not
to hold conventions in those states that had not yet ratified the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment.l' NOW adopted the boycott tactic
after another women's organization suggested that a boycott of unra-
tified states would be a powerful method of influencing legislators'
votes in favor of ratification.' 2  Missouri, acting as parenspatriae, 13
Commercial Purpose: Under the label "commercial" we shall include only that pur-
pose of businessmen which is the ordinary stated reason for individuals becoming
entrepreneurs - in a word, profit.
Economic Purpose: Under this category will be included all purposes relating to eco-
nomic self-interest except the commercial purpose. The hired laborer, under this
view, has an economic but non-commercial purpose.
Non-Economic Purpose: This expression will denote purposes which have no sub-
stantial content of material self-interest. Boycotts by church groups are good exam-
ples.
Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REv. 705, 712 (1962).
"Non-commercial" is used to cover both "economic and non-economic purposes." 1d at 713.
The parties stipulated that the purpose of the boycott campaign was the ratification of the
ERA, which is a non-commercial purpose under Coons' definition.
8. The elements of a prima facie case of interference with business relationships or in-
tentional infliction of economic harm are the existence of a valid business relationship or ex-
pectancy, the defendant's knowledge of the relationship or expectancy, the defendant's
intentional interference with the relationship or expectancy inducing its breach or termination,
absence ofjustification for defendant's conduct, and damage to the party who lost the relation-
ship. Harber v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins., 390 F. Supp. 678, 683 (E.D. Mo. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 170
(8th Cir. 1975); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976 (1953);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, 767 (1939). The lower court held that the interest advanced by
NOW and NOW's exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition out-
weighed the interest in protecting business relationships. 467 F. Supp. at 305-06. The applica-
tion of tort law to boycotts is examined in Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suitfor Damages.- The
New Threat to Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 559 (1975); Comment, The
Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226 (1971); Comment, The Common Law and Constitutional
Status of Anti-Discrimination Boycotts, 66 YALE L.J. 397 (1956).
9. Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.031 (Vernon 1979) provides, "Every contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the state is unlawful." Under Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 416.141 (Vernon 1979), Missouri antitrust law is to be interpreted in harmony with federal
antitrust law. The court's denial of relief on the federal antitrust complaint necessitated the
dismissal of the state antitrust complaint.
10. The National Organization for Women was founded by Betty Friedan and other
feminists in 1966. NOW is dedicated to achieving equality for women in social, economic, and
political life. The organization is strongly oriented to political action and is one of the most
vigorous proponents of the ERA.
11. The states in which the ERA remains unratified are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. C. BIRD, THE SPIIT OF HOUSTON: THE
FIRST NATIONAL WOMENS' CONFERENCE, AN OFFICIAL REPORT, 50 (1978). Idaho, Kentucky,
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee have rescinded their ratification of the ERA. U.S.
News and World Report, April 2, 1979, at 10. The legality of the recision of ERA ratifications
is doubtful. See Burke, Validity of Attempts to Rescind Ratification of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, 8 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1976); Elder, Article V Justiciability, and the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 63 (1978). Presumably NOW would take the position that an
attempted recision is invalid, and that the state is still officially ratified and not subject to
boycott.
12. 467 F. Supp. at 291-92. The district court's factual findings were substantially
adopted by the court of appeals. See 620 F.2d at 1302-03.
13. In the English legal system, the King had the power to protect the legally helpless in
his role as parenspatriae (father of the country). For a discussion of the origin of the power,
see Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). In the
brought suit for injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton
Act 4 after NOW's advocacy of the boycott lead organizations to
cancel their conventions scheduled in Missouri. 5
Acting alone, NOW could have lawfully refused to hold its con-
ventions in Missouri because the principle of freedom to contract
protects even the malicious refusal to deal.' 6 Nevertheless, before
the antitrust laws could be invoked, the court had to find that NOW
participated in a "combination" or "conspiracy"' 7 within the mean-
ing of the first section of the Sherman Act. In antitrust law conspir-
acy may be proved by circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances warrant a finding that the conspirators had a common
understanding, a unity of purpose, or a meeting of minds. '8 The dis-
trict court found a conspiracy in NOW's invitation to others to act,
in the strong motive for joint action, and in NOW's knowledge that
others were taking similar action.' 9 Harmony of action, or conscious
parallelism, is no substitute for finding an agreement.20 The circuit
court did not address the issue directly but rather simply stated that
United States, the power to act as parenspatriae passed to the states. Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
The states have been granted parenspatriae standing in a variety of cases. See, e.g., North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (dispute over water rights); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (dispute over interstate commerce in natural gas); New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (dispute over discharge of sewage). The state may not sue as
parenspatriae when the suit brought in its name benefits private individuals, but a state may
sue if it complains of a wrong that harms its industries, retards its development or relegates it
to an inferior economic position among the states. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 451 (1945).
Therefore, the question in this case was whether Missouri was suing on behalf of the
tourist industry, which could sue for itself, or on behalf of the whole state. The district court
found that the boycott injured the whole economy of Missouri, since every $1 spent at a con-
vention generates $2.78 in spending. 467 F. Supp. at 298-99 Parens patriae standing was
granted on the basis of the economic injury; the court also granted Missouri standing because
the state legislature was the ultimate target of the boycott. Id at 301. For a discussion of
parens patriae standing, see Comment, Standing of States to Represent the Interests of Their
Citizens in Federal Court, 21 AM. L. REV. 224 (1971); Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Suits by a
State as Parens Patriae, 48N.C. L. REV. 963 (1970).
14. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), provides in part,
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. . . when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened con-
duct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity ....
15. 620 F.2d at 1303.
16. See, e.g., Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1928).
17. The phrase "contracts, combinations or conspiracies" becomes "an alliterative com-
pound noun, roughly translated to mean 'concerted action.'" L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTI-TRUST 312 (1976), quoted in FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182,
1189 (D.D.C. 1978).
18. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
19. 467 F. Supp. at 296, citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226
(1939). The factors cited by the Supreme Court gave rise to a doctrine of conscious parallel-
ism, a proposition that conscious participation alone might be sufficient to prove a conspiracy.
ANTITRUST ADVISOR 9 (C. Hills 2d. ed. 1971).
20. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
NOW organized a boycott.2 '
In response to the conclusion that NOW was part of a combina-
tion or conspiracy, NOW argued that the antitrust laws do not apply
to noncommercial organizations, even though NOW is not an organ-
ization specifically exempted from the Act.22 The court did not ex-
pressly accept or reject this proposition but rather granted an
exemption from the Sherman Act based upon the noncommercial
purpose of the boycott.23  Any blanket exemption that relied upon
the status of the boycotters would have been difficult to justify since
the language of Section 1 could not be more inclusive,24 and the
Supreme Court has held that exemptions from the Sherman Act are
more properly granted by Congress than by the courts.25
The expansive language of Section 1 was once thought to re-
quire a literal interpretation and application of its provisions.26 The
Supreme Court nonetheless decisively rejected the literal interpreta-
tion and the general rule of antitrust enforcement is that only unrea-
sonable restraint of trade is unlawful.2 7 Commerce could not
function under a strict construction of the Sherman Act because as
Justice Brandeis observed, "Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains." Accordingly the test of lawful-
ness under the Sherman Act is whether the arrangement promotes or
hinders free competition. 28 The exception to the "rule of reason" 29 is
the per se rule of illegality that is applied to practices30 considered so
21. 620 F.2d at 1303.
22. The Sherman Act exempts labor unions, and agricultural and horticultural co-opera-
tives from the provisions of the antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
23. 620 F.2d at 1311. Note that the exemption was based upon the noncommercial pur-
pose of the boycott rather than the noncommercial status of the boycotters.
24. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). In Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the Supreme Court explained the broad
language of § I of the Sherman Act:
As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed defini-
tions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or through particulari-
zation defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape.
Id at 359-60.
25. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng's v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), a canon
of the engineers' ethical code prohibiting competitive bidding was declared by the Supreme
Court to be violative of the Sherman Act. The engineers argued that the canon protected
public safety by discouraging underbidding designed to win competitive bids, which would
lead to shoddy construction. The Court said that such an argument was better addressed to the
Congress than to the courts. Id at 689-90. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975).
26. The Government urged a literal interpretation and application in the landmark case
of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 23 (1911).
27. Id at 65.
28. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917).
29. The phrase comes from Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).
30. Examples of banned practices include price-fixing (United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440 (1977); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223 (1939)), horizontal agreements to divide sales territory (United States v. Topco Associates,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238
inimical to free competition as to deserve condemnation without ex-
amination of their reasonableness.?
The boycott, "[a] method of pressuring a party with whom one
has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, pa-
tronage or services from the target,"32 has long been held illegal per
se in a purely commercial context.33 The boycott is prohibited as a
naked restraint of trade with no other purpose than stifling competi-
tion,34 even though boycotters have offered at least colorable pur-
poses for their actions other than destroying competition.35 The
Supreme Court has decided that evidence on the defendant's pur-
pose in mounting a boycott is properly excluded from consideration
in boycott cases.36
Even though the advantages of the per se rule are numerous,37
lower tribunals were unwilling to take the Supreme Court at its
word, and frequently did not apply the per se rule even in a commer-
cial context. The lower courts took the view that a rigid application
of the per se rule to any boycott would lead to absurdities38 and that
the per se rule was a short formula expressing an extended, though
covert, analysis of the purpose of a boycott.39  The modem courts
(1899)), and arrangements tying the sale of one item to the purchase of another (Times-Pica-
yune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953)).
31. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), notes the usefulness of
the "per se rule" as a tool in avoiding complex and prolonged investigation of the economic
history of an entire industry to determine the impact of a particular practice, "an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Id. at 5. The relative merits of the "per se rule" and
the "rule of reason" as applied to commercial boycotts are examined in Note, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1531 (1958).
32. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978).
33. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Radiant Burn-
ers v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1960) (dicta); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5
(1957) (dicta); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). The earliest Supreme Court
boycott case was Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904). The development of the rule of the
per se illegality of commercial boycotts is traced in Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se
Violations of the Sherman Act (pts I & 2), 10 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 302, 387 (1942). Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955).
34. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
35. E.g., in Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1960),
defendant maintained that its restrictions were motivated by a desire to maintain safe appli-
ances. Two early cases struck down boycotts as violations of the Sherman Act even though the
purposes of the boycotts were noncommercial. See American Mercury v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224
(D. Mass. 1926) (boycott's purpose was to the sale of obscene books); Council of Defense v.
International Magazine Corp., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920) (boycott's purpose was to prevent the
sale of allegedly unpatriotic magazines).
36. Fashion Originators' Guide v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
37. See note 31 supra.
38. The Seventh Circuit did not believe that the Sherman Act was intended to achieve
such a ludicrous result as banning a concerted refusal to sell fire insurance to a known arsonist
or weapons to a known bankrobber. Ruddy Brook Clothes v. British & Foreign Marine Ins.
Co., 195 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1952).
39. See, e.g., Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). The district court stated that the Supreme Court consistently condemned the
result of boycotts, not the boycotts themselves. See also Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem.
seem willing to apply the rule of reason to commercial boycotts.
This attitude was reflected by language in a Supreme Court opinion
declaring a boycott void "absent any justification derived from the
policy of another statute or otherwise." 4
Without clear precedent to follow on the legality of the noncom-
mercial boycott,4 ' the circuit court turned to the policy of the Sher-
man Act for guidance. The Supreme Court has stated that the
purpose of the Sherman Act is to control the problems of business
competition.42 Consequently, the court of appeals reasoned that the
Sherman Act should not be used to control nonbusiness behavior,
even though implied exclusions from the Act have been disapproved
by the Supreme Court.43
The circuit court relied heavily on the distinction Eastern Rail-
road Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight" makes between
lobbying and activities traditionally forbidden by antitrust law. In
Noerr the Supreme Court used an implied exclusion to deny anti-
trust liability based on plaintiffs efforts to secure legislation unfavor-
able to competitors. The Court looked at the railroads' campaign as
a type of lobbying, a political activity essentially dissimilar to activ-
ity traditionally proscribed by the Sherman Act.45 Since the Sher-
man Act was not meant to regulate political activity, even lobbying
with an anticompetitive purpose does not give rise to Sherman Act
liability. The circuit court reasoned that since NOW's boycott was
not motivated by a desire for profits or the elimination of competi-
tion, the boycott was further from the acts banned by the Sherman
Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F.
Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
40. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1962). Defendant had re-
moved telephone lines from plaintiffs office. Plaintiff, a securities broker, needed the lines in
his business. The Exchange attempted to justify its action by pointing to its need for self-
regulation. The Court, however, did not consider this justification adequate. Id
41. See, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552 (1937). In New
Negro Alliance, black activists picketed a store urging its black customers to boycott the estab-
lishment until it began to hire black workers. The Court held that the picketing was a pro-
tected labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1973), even though
none of the picketers worked at the store. But see Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950), in which the facts were identical to those in New Negro Alliance with the exception that
the picketers advocated boycotting a store until it hired black workers in proportion to the
number of black customers. The picketing was enjoined by the lower court, and the Supreme
Court sustained the injunction on the grounds that racial quotas are against public policy.
42. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940); United States Dept. of
Just., Report of the Attorney General's Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws 1 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as The 1955 Report].
43. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978). In establishing
the doctrine against implied exclusions, the Court analogized the situation to the case of con-
gressional regulation of an industry. Congressional regulation does not displace antitrust law
unless the regulatory scheme is clearly repugnant to antitrust law, because such law is meant to
reach as wide a range of activities as possible. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
44. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
45. Id at 136.
Act than the railroad lobbying permitted in Noerr.4 6 Missouri ar-
gued that a boycott is essentially different from a lobbying effort, but
the majority did not accept the proffered factual distinction. The
dissent argued that the majority's confidence in the Noerr court's
factual distinction between regulable political and economic activity
was misplaced.47 In subsequent cases discussing the relationship be-
tween political activity and antitrust law, the Supreme Court aban-
doned its factual analysis of similarities between the acts in question
and acts governed by antitrust law.
48
The Noerr-Pennington political exemption is based upon judi-
cial reluctance to construe the Sherman Act in a way that would
infringe upon the first amendment right to petition the govern-
ment.4 9 The circuit court shared the Supreme Court's reluctance and
categorized NOW's boycott as a legitimate attempt to lobby the leg-
islature, which is an action protected by the first amendment. The
opinion, however, does not discuss whether noncommercial boycotts
have customarily been protected as part of the right to petition, pos-
sibly because the Supreme Court has not specifically defined the
scope of the right.5"
Some activities specifically protected by the Noerr-Pennington
exemption include lobbying legislatures,5 lobbying administrative
agencies, 52 and conducting litigation. 3 Petitioning has been broadly
defined by commentators as "any conduct taken to influence a gov-
ernmental decision making body." 54 The court saw NOW's boycott
as an acceptable effort to influence the Missouri legislature. The
Supreme Court, however, has taken a narrower view of what consti-
tutes the protected activity of lobbying by defining lobbying as repre-
sentations made directly to the legislature or its members.55 NOW's
boycott was made not to the legislature, but to the businesses of a
46. 620 F.2d at 1311-12.
47. Id at 1319-20.
48. See California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the evolution
of what has come to be known as the political exemption doctrine, see Fischel, Antitrust Liabil-
ityfor Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits ofthe Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 80 (1977).
49. 365 U.S. at 141.
50. See Costeilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire. The Noerr-Pennington Defenses, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 333 (1967); Holzer, An Analysisfor Reconciling the Antitrust Laws with the Right to
Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light oCantor v. Detroit-Edison, 27 EMORY L. REV. 673 (1978);
Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View ofthe Antitrust and Constitutional
Ramifications oPetitioning the Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281 (1973).
51. Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
52. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
53. See, e.g., Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951
(D. Conn. 1977); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 423 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
54. Holzer, supra note 50 at 647 n.8.
55. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953).
boycotted state. The representation was not by the historically pro-
tected methods of persuasion, letter writing, publicity campaigns, or
direct contact with legislators, but by coercive action.
56
Additionally, the court found that NOW's action was protected
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.57 Nearly every
violation of antitrust law involves some element of speech, but the
first amendment is not a barrier to the enforcement of antitrust law
when the speech violates a valid statute. 5a The court did not find
that the boycott violated the Sherman Act and, therefore, NOW's
speech advocating the boycott was protected.
While NOW's boycott was found to be an exercise of first
amendment rights, 59 the court unfortunately did not decide the cru-
cial question of whether a boycott is a protected expression or a
regulable action.60 Had the court analyzed the facts more closely, it
might have found the picketing boycott cases useful.6 In both of the
picketing boycott cases, political expression was coupled with action
and denunciations of racial discrimination with marching. NOW's
boycott couples advocacy of the ratification of the ERA with a con-
certed refusal to deal. The ERA espousal is protected expression
while the boycott is regulable action. The first amendment does not
prevent the legislature from controlling substantive evils;62 however,
the court thought that the possibility of impinging on first amend-
ment freedoms was worse than the economic harm created by the
boycott.
The district court summarily rejected Missouri's contention that
the convention boycott was illegalper se as a secondary boycott.63 A
secondary boycott is a combination to influence someone by exerting
economic pressure against those who deal with him.' Secondary
boycotts were illegal at common-law even before they became a tar-
get of antitrust legislation, because the victim of the boycott is not
the source of the boycotter's grievance and cannot satisfy the boycot-
56. Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1211, 1244 (1967).
57. 620 F.2d at 1319.
58. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418 (1911). See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
59. 620 F.2d at 1319.
60. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 444 (1970). The Supreme
Court has never adopted the late Mr. Justice Black's absolutist interpretation of the first
amendment, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969), but neither is all
conduct containing an element of speech protected. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
61. See note 33 supra.
62. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
63. 620 F.2d at 1312-13 n.12.
64. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930). See also Bar-
nard & Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsH. L. REV. 137, 140 (1940).
ter's demands by himself.65 The court's unwillingness to discuss the
secondary boycott may be traced to the fact that the law on secon-
dary boycotts developed in the context of labor-management rela-
tions.66
The essence of the majority's reasoning was succinctly stated in
the lower court's opinion: "There are areas of our economic and
political life in which the precepts of antitrust must yield to other
social values.' 67 The court does not share the view of some observ-
ers who believe that the Sherman Act actually helps preserve per-
sonal and social liberty, which is threatened by concentrated
economic power.68 Neither did the court seem concerned about pri-
vate groups wielding power that is usually reserved to elected gov-
ernments, 69 or about zealots imposing great economic harm in
pursuit of their own ends.70
In Missouri v. NOW, the court was asked to apply the Sherman
Act to a situation in which conduct affecting interstate commerce
was undertaken with a political purpose by a noncommercial organi-
zation. The court acted on the premise that a noncommercial organ-
ization does not obtain blanket immunity from the Sherman Act
simply because of the organization's noncommercial status. This
part of the court's holding was justified when the policy of the Act is
conceived as either protection of the free market 7' or protection of
individuals from concentrated economic power.72 There is no prin-
cipled basis for exempting noncommercial organizations from the
Act because the harm is the same regardless of whether the group
inflicting it is a commercial or noncommercial organization. The
court's decision applied neither the per se rule7 3 nor the rule of rea-
son7 4 to NOW's convention boycott, but extended the Noerr-Pen-
nington political exemption from the Sherman Act. The Noerr-
Pennington exemption protects efforts to persuade the legislature.
This decision, however, gives the same exemption to efforts to coerce
65. Comment, The Common Law and Constitutional Status ofAnti-Discrimination Boy-
cotts, 66 YALE L.J. 397, 399-400 (1957).
66. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341 (1938).
Secondary boycotts may be regulated under antitrust law, labor law or both. Note, Secondary
Boycotts Under Labor andAntitrust. A Choice a/Policy, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 653 (1974).
67. 467 F. Supp. at 305, quoting Handler, Annual Review ofAntitrust Developments, 71
YALE L.J. 75, 88 (1961).
68. The 1955 Report, supra note 42, at 2. It is ironic that a commentator once suggested
that the antitrust law be used to combat racial discrimination. See Marcus, Civil Rights and the
Anti- Trust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 171 (1951).
69. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1899).
70. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal,
1970 DuKE L.J. 247 (1970) (noncommercial boycotts should be subject to a "per se rule" of
illegality).
71. The 1955 Report, supra note 42, at 1.
72. See note 68 supra
73. See notes 30, 31 supra
74. See notes 28, 29 and accompanying text supra.
a state legislature by applying economic pressure to the state's busi-
nesses. A noncommercial boycott has now been categorized as an
activity protected by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of petition, even though activity has tradition-
ally been amenable to more regulation than pure speech.75 The
Fifth Circuit has already recognized the lower court's decision as es-
tablishing a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
boycotts.76 It remains to be seen whether the reasoning of the court
of appeals will create a judicial exception to the broad sweep of anti-
trust laws.
75. See general, Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to Peti-
tion, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1211 (1967).
76. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1979). [CAsE-
NOTE BY SUSAN K. WETZEL.]
CRIMINAL LAW - Marital Relationship Creates a Duty of Care
Between Spouses - A Spouse Has a Duty to Summon Medical
Aid When the Other is in a Condition Necessitating Immediate
Medical Attention. Commonwealth v. Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct.
-, 402 A.2d 692 (1979).
In Commonwealth v. Konz,' the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
held 2 that a spouse has a legal duty to summon medical aid when the
other spouse is in a condition necessitating immediate medical atten-
tion. Failure to perform this legal duty may result in a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter4 if the evidence adduced at trial supports
a finding that the requisite degree of negligence was exhibited,' and
that the omission of the duty was the proximate cause of the spouse's
death.6 An accomplice may also be found guilty' even though he
1. - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 402 A.2d 692 (1979).
2. Judge Price delivered the opinion of the court. Judge Cercone concurred in the re-
suit, Judge Van der Voort specially concurred, and Judge Spaeth dissented.
3. - Pa. Super. Ct. at _ 402 A.2d at 695.
4. A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the
doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a
lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another
person.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504(a) (Purdon 1973).
Liability for the commission of an offense may be based on an omission to act if the
omission is expressly and sufficiently defined by the law or if a duty to perform the omitted act
is otherwise imposed by law. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301(b) (Purdon 1973).
5. The act must be done in a reckless or grossly negligent manner to constitute involun-
tary manslaughter. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1973). The pertinent section
defining reckless and grossly negligent conduct provides,
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct
and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b) (3) and (4) (Purdon 1973).
6. See note 14 infra, pertaining to proximate cause.
7. "[A] person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if,
with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he aids or ...
attempts to aid such other person in. . . committing it." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c)(1)
(Purdon 1973) (emphasis added).
Commonwealth v. Konz merely held that Mrs. Konz's duty extended to the accomplice
Erikson. The court noted, however, that there remained an unresolved issue: whether one
may be held liable as an accomplice, which requires intent, in the commission of an offense
may not have had a legal' duty in an individual capacity. 9
Reverend David Konz, a diabetic, administered insulin to him-
self for seventeen years preceding his death. After an encounter with
an evangelist speaker, Konz proclaimed his desire to withdraw from
insulin and to allow God to cure him of his diabetic condition.' 0 He
publicly promised, however, that he would "do nothing foolish" and
would take insulin if his condition necessitated that he do so. For
the next three weeks, Konz administered insulin to himself only once
or twice.
Two days prior to his death, Konz frantically searched for his
insulin when he began experiencing insulin debt. His wife had hid-
den his insulin to help him refuse the temptation to use it. Konz was
physically barred twice from leaving the house by Erikson, " I a friend
of the Konzes. Erikson and Mrs. Konz then forced Konz into the
bedroom where they eventually calmed him. From this point until
his death, Reverend Konz made no overt effort to procure aid for
himself.
Although evidence presented at trial indicated that it was appar-
ent that Reverend Konz needed immediate aid, 2 neither Erikson
that requires only negligence or recklessness. Nevertheless, the court indicated that the law of
other jurisdictions would support such a finding of criminal liability, citing Fitshugh v. State,
207 Ark. 117, 179 S.W.2d 173 (1944); State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 456 S.W.2d 840 (1970);
Wade v. State, 174 Tenn. 248, 124 S.W.2d 710 (1939). See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R. 175
(1964).
8. Erikson's moral duty to Reverend Konz was not enough to impose criminal penalties
on him. Therefore, the court articulated a legal duty that Erikson owed to Konz, as an exten-
sion of the duty Mrs. Konz owed to her husband. See People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113
N.W. 1128 (1907) (a moral duty is not enough to impose criminal liability for an omission of a
duty).
9. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(e) (Purdon 1973) provides,
In any prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability of the defendant is based
upon the conduct of another person pursuant to this section, it is no defense that the
offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes
of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason
legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
10. The Pennsylvania Superior.Court did not address the issue of whether or not Konz's
proclaimed religious beliefs would negate any duty defendants might have owed, apparently
because the court found that evidence indicated that Konz not only would have accepted med-
ical aid, but he attempted to procure it himself. For a discussion of refusals by adults to accept
medical treatment because of religious beliefs, compare Application of President and Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), reh. denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) andRaleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) with In re Brook's Estate, 32 II. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), and Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109
Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973).
11. Stephen Erikson and Reverend Konz made a "pact" that they would pray together
before Konz administered the insulin.
12. Testimony indicated that
the decedent began to experience the acute need for insulin on Saturday morning.
He was very thirsty, vehemently expressed his desire for insulin, and even went so far
as to attempt to summon medical assistance for himself. Later in the day, he can-
celled an upcoming speaking engagement, and as the day wore on he appeared tired
and began to complain of stomach cramps, both being additional symptoms of insu-
lin debt.
His condition increasingly deteriorated as the week-end wore on, with the dece-
nor Mrs. Konz made any attempt to summon medical assistance.
Two days after the onset of insulin debt, Reverend Konz died from
ketoacidosis 3 as a result of the failure to obtain medical aid.'4
Mrs. Konz and Stephen Erikson were convicted of involuntary
manslaughter in the death of Reverend David Konz. Post-trial mo-
tions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were filed on their
behalf. The court of common pleas granted the motion in arrest of
judgment,' 5 concluding that even though the duty to summon aid
arises only if the other spouse is in a helpless condition, the Com-
monwealth failed to prove that Konz was in fact helpless.' 6 The Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the order in arrest of
judgment. The court held that the duty to aid one's helpless spouse
arises when the sick spouse is in a condition necessitating immediate
medical attention, and that evidence adduced at trial was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict.
17
Sections 301 and 2504 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code' 8 pro-
vide that one may be guilty of involuntary manslaughter for an
omission to act if the duty to act is imposed by law. A duty of care
arising from the marital relationship had not been defined either by
statute or case law in Pennsylvania prior to the Konz decision.19 In
other jurisdictions, a duty of care arising from the marital relation-
ship is well-settled law, although the standard of care is vague. 20
dent frequently vomiting throughout Sunday, and being bed-ridden practically all
day. Despite the fact that his condition grew progressively worse, his wife summoned
no aid. Indeed, she not only failed to summon aid, but, in effect, prevented her hus-
band from making contact with any outsiders, against his wishes.
Commonwealth v. Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct. at _ 402 A.2d at 696.
13. Ketoacidosis is diabetic acidosis produced by the presence of an excessive amount of
ketone acids in the body. I. Dox AND B. MELLONI, MELLONI'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY (1979).
14. The court concluded that the jury was justified in making a finding of proximate
cause because testimony presented at trial indicated that hospitalization as late as Sunday
night would have assured him of a ninety-nine percent chance of survival. Commonwealth v.
Konz, supra at 696. For the degree of medical certainty required to establish causation, see
Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 244, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978); Commonwealth v. Webb, 449 Pa. 490,
296 A.2d 734 (1972); Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Radford, 428 Pa. 279, 236 A.2d 802 (1968).
15. Commonwealth v. Erikson, 37 Leh. 126 (1976).
16. Id at 136-37.
17. Commonwealth v. Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct .... 402 A.2d 692, 695 (1979).
18. See note 4 supra.
19. The court in Commonwealth v. Konz found that
[tihe state of the law as to the duty owed by one spouse to obtain medical assistance
for the other is not well-settled, with only a handful of cases addressing the issue.
Indeed, our research uncovered no recent Pennsylvania case of import to the instant
appeal. Nevertheless, a review of the case law from other jurisdictions discloses a
duty of care, vague though it may be, arising from the spousal relationship.
Commonwealth v. Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ - 402 A.2d 692, 695 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dicta acknowledging
the duty created by the marital relationship); Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W.
646 (1906) (duty recognized but conviction of involuntary manslaughter reversed due to find-
ing of husband's good faith reliance on wife's wishes); People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113
N.W. 1128 (1907) (court recognized duty of care between husband and wife and refused to
Historically, recognition of this duty of care was predicated on
the theory that the husband was his wife's protector and, therefore,
was bound to provide her with medical aid.21 The husband-wife re-
lationship was analogized to the parent-child relationship to the ex-
tent that both were considered relationships of "protector" to
"dependent." This analogy gave rise to a recognition of a duty of
care between spouses22 and, more significantly, to a declaration in at
least two jurisdictions that the duty to summon medical assistance
arises only if the other spouse is in a helpless condition.23
The rationale underlying the standard of "helplessness" was
clearly articulated by the Supreme Court of Montana in State v.
Mal. 24 Affirming a conviction of manslaughter for failure of the
husband to summon aid for his helpless wife, the court said,
We are aware that the large majority of homicide cases in-
volving a failure to provide medical aid involve a parent-child re-
lationship. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that a person of
mature years is not generally in a helpless condition. However,
fact situations do arise, such as the instant case, wherein it is ap-
parent that an adult is as helpless as the newborn.
25
Most courts do not find it necessary to articulate a specific stan-
dard of care in order to determine when or under what circum-
stances the defendant must act.26 The approach more commonly
utilized is to first determine whether a general duty of care exists
between the parties. If such a duty exists, the court then examines
the defendant's failure to act in light of the total circumstances, and
determines whether the requisite degree of recklessness or negligence
extend duty from husband to his paramour); State v. Many, 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868
(1961) (husband has duty to aid wife who is helpless); Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P.
387 (1888) (husband has duty of care to his wife because he is her protector).
21. See People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128(1907). In that case the court
ruled that
[i]f a person who sustains to another the legal relation of protector, as husband to
wife, parent to child, master to seaman, etc. . . . willfully and negligently fails to
make such reasonable and proper efforts to rescue him as he might have done, ...
he is guilty of manslaughter at least, if by reason of his omission of duty the depen-
dent person dies.
Id at 207, 113 N.W. at 1129. Accord, State v. Maly, 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961);
Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
22. Although the cases recognizing a marital relationship duty of care pertain only to a
husband's duty to his wife, public policy and the Equal Rights Amendment dictate that the
duty is also imposed on the wife to obtain aid for her husband. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mon-
trom, 36 Leh. 241, 252 (1975) (opinion touching upon reciprocal duties between husband and
wife under the Equal Rights Amendment).
23. See Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W. 646 (1906); State v. Mally, 139
Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961). See generall I R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 332 (1957).
24. 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
25. Id at 609, 366 P.2d at 873.
26. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907); State v. Decker,
157 Mont. 361, 485 P.2d 695 (1971); Commonwealth v. Aurick, 342 Pa. 282, 19 A.2d 920
(1941).
was present so as to support a conviction.27 The general rule is that
the evidence must support a finding that the defendant's conduct was
"such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be in-
compatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a
disregard for human life or an indifference to the consequences. "28
Section 302(b) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, in conjunction
with Section 2504, is essentially a codification of this common-law
rule pertaining to criminal negligence.29
Acknowledging the absence of applicable precedent in Penn-
sylvania,3" the superior court looked to the law of other jurisdictions
to support its conclusion that a duty of care exists between spouses.
In Jones v. United States,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a failure to act may constitute a breach of legal
duty "where one stands in a certain status relationship to another"
and the marital relationship is such a "status relationship. '3 2 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court of Montant in Territory v. Manton3 3 de-
clared that "duty called upon [the husband] to protect his wife," and
that in breaching the duty he was guilty of manslaughter.34 The Su-
perior Court ,of Pennsylvania relied solely on Jones and Manton in
concluding that a duty of care exists between spouses, although other
jurisdictions are in accord.35
A split of opinion within the Konz court resulted from the ma-
27. See, e.g., State v. Decker, 157 Mont. 361, 485 P.2d 695 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 344 A.2d 850 (1975).
28. 40 AM. JUR.2D Homicide § 92 (1968). Accord, Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky.
95, 93 S.W. 646 (1906); State v. Decker, 157 Mont. 361, 485 P.2d 695 (1971); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 302 (Purdon 1973).
29. See notes 4 and 5 supra. See also Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. Super. Ct. 317,
344 A.2d 850 (1975) (Robert, J., concurring). Justice Roberts stated that the Crimes Code is an
"accurate and precise formulation of the law of involuntary manslaughter as developed in our
cases." Id at 321 n.15, 344 A.2d at 857 n.15.
30. See note 19 supra.
31. 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The issue in Jones was whether defendant had a legal
duty to support a young child of whom she had custodial care. The child died from malnutri-
tion resulting from serious neglect. The court concluded that defendant had a legal duty to the
child. Id
32. Id at 310. The court further stated that
[tihere are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute breach of
a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a duty
to care for another; second, where one stands in a certain status relationship to an-
other; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another, and
fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the
helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.
Id
33. 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888). In Territory v. Marnon, the intoxicated husband left his
intoxicated wife in the snow where she eventually died of exposure. The court held that intoxi-
cation was no defense to the husband's breach of duty to protect his wife.
34. 19 P. at 388.
35. See, e.g., Neveils v. State, 145 So. 2d 883 (Fla. App. 1962) (proximate cause was the
issue, although dicta implies an interspousal duty of care); Nelson v. State, 58 Ga. App. 243,
198 S.E. 305 (1938); Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W. 646 (1906).
jority's and the dissent's attempts to dictate a definitive standard of
care mandating when or under what circumstances the duty to sum-
mon medical aid arises. The majority defined the scope of the duty
to encompass the unique fact situation in Konz wherein the spouse
in need of immediate medical attention was not necessarily help-
less.36 Judge Price dispensed with the "helpless" standard of care
delineated by the dissent, labelling it a worthless standard in the in-
stant case. 37 The court stressed that testimony presented at trial indi-
cated that medical aid would have been useless had the defendants
waited until Konz was helpless before summoning aid.3"
Upholding the standard of "helplessness" employed in both
Maly and Westrup, the dissent criticized the majority for first deter-
mining the result it desired and then proceeding to formulate the
standard needed to reach the desired result. 39 Judge Spaeth main-
tained that the proper approach is to begin with a definite standard
and then determine whether the facts evidence a violation of that
duty.4°
The inference drawn from the dissent's approach is that "duty"
and "breach of duty" are sufficient elements to establish liability if
the duty is narrowly defined. Judge Speath stated that it was unnec-
essary to consider whether the failure to act was reckless or grossly
negligent conduct.4' Section 250442 of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, however, requires that the conduct 43 causing death be reckless
or grossly negligent, and section 302(b)" of the Code clearly defines
recklessness and negligence. Therefore, the approach urged by the
dissent, which would negate the requirement that the jury find reck-
lessness or gross negligence, contravenes the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code.45
36. - Pa. Super. Ct. - - 402 A.2d 692, 695 (1979).
37. Id at _ 402 A.2d at 696.
38. Because Reverend Konz was conscious until some time Sunday night, he did not
appear to be helpless. Testimony presented at trial indicated that once Konz slipped into a
diabetic coma, his condition would have progressed to such a point that medical aid could not
have saved him. For excerpts of this testimony, see Brief for Appellee, Commonwealth v.
Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct. _:_ 402 A.2d 692 (1979).
39. Commonwealth v. Konz, - Pa. Super. Ct. - . 402 A.2d 692, 698 (1979) (Spaeth,
J., dissenting).
40. Judge Spaeth stated that
[if criminal liability is to be imposed, the duty of the accused must be so specifically
defined that the accused may understand it, and the jury decide whether it has been
breached. . . one should define the duty first, and then look to see whether the facts
show a violation of that duty.
Id at _ 402 A.2d at 701 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
41. Id at _ 402 A.2d at 701 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
42. See note 4 supra.
43. "Conduct," is "an act or omission andits accompanying slate ofmind, or, where rele-
vant, a series of acts and omissions." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 103 (Purdon 1973) (emphasis
added).
44. See note 5 supra.
45. See notes 4, 5 and 6 supra.
The majority also defined a new, specific standard of care with-
out expressly reviewing the issue of defendants' culpability. Judge
Price's opinion indicates, however, that the court did find a degree of
culpability sufficient to justify the jury verdict.46 In light of the fact
that the common law of Pennsylvania, as well as the Crimes Code,
requires such a finding4 7 and that the language of the majority opin-
ion indicates that gross negligence was exhibited by the defendant,48
the majority probably did not choose to bypass the negligence re-
quirement as the dissent did. The failure of the court to expressly
address the culpability issue, however, allows room to draw the op-
posite inference - that the court set forth a specific duty, the breach
of which will render defendant criminally liable.49
The majority implicitly carved out an exception to the new stan-
dard of care by distinguishing the facts in Konz from the circum-
stances in both Mall, and Westrup.5° The analysis of the court
indicates that when the spouse is in need of immediate medical at-
tention, but rationally and unwaveringly refuses aid, the other spouse
is not bound by a duty to summon aid against the sick spouse's
wishes.
A conviction of involuntary manslaughter was reversed in Com-
monwealth v. Westrup, in which the wife steadfastly refused to
have a doctor assist her during childbirth.52 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that "in failing to earlier call in a physician [the hus-
band] acted in good faith and at her request."53 In State v. Maly,54
46. Subsequent to reviewing the facts of the case, the majority in Konz concluded that
[ilt is apparent that the symptoms of Reverend Konz's insulin debt were in evidence
throughout the week-end and were apparent to those around him - even his eleven
year old daughter ...
Taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, and Dorothy Konz's
knowledge of decedent's diabetic condition and his lack of insulin injections over a
three-week span prior to this time, we find that she, as decedent's wife, had a duty to
summon medical assistance for him.
- Pa. Super. Ct. at _ 402 A.2d 692 at 696 (emphasis added). The court further stated that
"under the circumstances of this case, we hold that Mrs. Konz, as wife of the deceased, and
Stephen Erikson, as accomplice to Mrs. Konz, were under a duty to summon medical aid for
Reverend Konz, and this duty was breached." Id (emphasis added).
47. See notes 4, 5 and 29 supra
48. See note 47 supra.
49. Even if liability is based on an omission of a duty that is imposed by law (as provided
for in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301(b)(l) (Purdon 1973)), breach of the legal duty is not
enough to impose liability without proof of recklessness or gross negligence as required by 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1973).
50. This exception was not part of the holding of the case. The fact that Konz did not
refuse aid, and undoubtedly would not have refused it had it been offered, was material, how-
ever, to the decision of the court.
51. 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W. 646 (1906).
52. In addition to the wife's unwavering refusal, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky also
considered evidence with regard to her state of mind and found that she was an intelligent
woman who made the decision to give birth without a doctor's assistance only after extensive
reading, correspondence with a woman doctor, and careful thought. Id at 96, 93 S.W. at 647.
53. Id
54. 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
the defendant failed to summon aid in a timely fashion for his wife
who became comatose after a serious fall. The appellate court held
that a duty to the helpless wife arose, stating that "[tjhe record is
replete with evidence that the wife could not have consciously or
rationally denied medical aid."" Because of the husband's delay in
summoning aid, the conviction was affirmed. In Konz, the court
stated, "the record does not indicate that Reverend Konz refused or
would have refused any medical assistance. Indeed, the record sup-
ports the opposite conclusion. "56 Therefore, the implication is that
the duty of the defendants arose because Konz was in a condition
that necessitated immediate medical attention and because he didnot
rationally or unwaveringly refuse aid
The majority defined a standard of care according to the specific
circumstances of the Konz case. The duty owed by one spouse to
summon medical aid when the other needs immediate medical atten-
tion is not an absolute duty or exclusive standard of care. Rather, it
is a duty subject to exceptions and, therefore, should be applied with
flexibility.
Penal statutes must be strictly construed57 and a finding of reck-
lessness or gross negligence is expressly required by statute for a con-
viction of involuntary manslaughter.58 A determination of whether
the defendant's conduct is culpable in light of the particular set of
circumstances will give rise not only to a definition of a standard of
care, but also to a recognition of exceptions. Commonwealth v. Konz
illustrates that a definitive standard of care cannot be divorced from
a determination of culpability. Each tends to define the other.
The dissent, however, chose to dispense with the culpability re-
quirement. Although the majority dealt with culpability in a cursory
manner, the underlying rationale upon which the decision was predi-
cated was that "the defendants' conduct was such a departure from
the conduct of the ordinarily prudent person" as to justify the jury's
verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 9
The significance of Commonwealth v. Konz is that a Penn-
sylvania court clearly articulated for the first time that an affirmative
duty of care arises from the marital relationship. This duty "to sum-
mon medical aid when the other is in a condition necessitating the
55. Id at 609, 366 P.2d at 873.
56. - Pa. Super. Ct. at _ 402 A.2d at 696. The court also noted that "Reverend Konz,
upon discovering his insulin removed from the refrigerator, sought to contact the authorities to
obtain aid, but was prevented from doing so by appellees. On the day before Reverend Konz's
death, visitors to the Konz residence were not allowed admittance to see him, even though the
decedent seemingly welcomed their company." Id
57. See generally 10 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Crinmnal Law § 6 (1970).
58. See notes 4-7 and 9 supra
59. See notes 28, 29 and accompanying text supra
need for immediate medical attention"6 is entirely logical because it
reflects a commitment by the state judiciary to formulate a standard
appropriate to the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, with
such guidance the criminal courts in Pennsylvania will be able to
insure prudent evolution of this new duty of care.
60. - Pa. Super. Ct. at - 402 A.2d at 695.
[CASENOTE By ELIZABETH A. READ)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Exclusionary Rule - Recordings
Obtained in Violation of IRS Manual Procedures Admissible in
Subsequent Criminal Trial. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741 (1979)
In United States v. Caceres, I the Supreme Court held2 that evi-
dence obtained in violation of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regu-
lations could be admitted at the criminal trial of a taxpayer accused
of bribing an IRS agent. The decision affirms the Burger Court's
inclination to restrict the application of the exclusionary rule to those
situations in which its use will most efficaciously serve the primary
purpose of the rule'-the deterrence of illegal police conduct 4-and
marks another step in the Court's apparent desire to limit the rule's
application when police agencies have acted in "good faith."5
The IRS Manual provided detailed procedures which required
that agents obtain the written approval of certain IRS officials and
the Attorney General prior to the consensual recording of non-tele-
phone conversations.6 "Emergency" requests, those submitted less
than forty-eight hours prior to the intended recording activity, were
1. 440 U.S. 741 (1979), rev'g, 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court. Justices Marshall and Brennan dis-
sented.
3. 440 U.S. at 754-55. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-352 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35
(1965); Coe, The ALl Substantiality Test. A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10
GA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1975).
4. The seminal study by Professor Oaks suggests that the deterrent effect of the rule is
weak at best. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665, 706-57 (1970). More recently, political scientist Bradley Canon has found that the use of
search warrants has substantially increased in many cities since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precpitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 707-16
(1974). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 409-39 (1974).
5. See note 35 and accompanying text infrta
6. The regulations provide,
(1) The monitoring of non-telephone conversations with the consent of one party
requires the advance authorization of the Attorney General or any designated Assis-
tant Attorney General. Requests for such authority may be signed by the Director,
Internal Security Division, or, in his/her absence, the Acting Director. This author-
ity cannot be redelegated. These same officials may authorize temporary emergency
monitoring when exigent circumstances preclude requesting the authorization of the
Attorney General in advance. If the Director, Internal Security Division, cannot be
reached, the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) may grant emergency approval.
This authority cannot be redelegated.
(2) Written approval of the Attorney General must be requested 48 hours prior
to the use of mechanical, electronic or other devices to overhear, transmit or record a
non-telephone private conversation with the permission of one party to the conversa-
excepted from these procedures; approval for such requests could be
granted by the Director of the IRS' Internal Security Division.'
Prior to his second trial on charges of bribing8 Agent Robert
Yee during the audit of his 1971 tax returns, Dr. Alfredo Caceres
moved to suppress the recordings of three meetings9 that were re-
corded by Yee, alleging that the IRS had failed to follow its own
internal procedure for obtaining approval to record non-telephone
conversations.' ° Accepting Caceres' arguments, the district court
held that the "emergencies" relied on by the IRS to justify its use of
the less stringent procedures for the first two meetings were "created
wholly by the IRS"'" and, thus, were not within the intent of the
regulation.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals premised its affirmance of
the exclusion order 2 on the denial of due process, citing United
States v. Sourapas13 and two other cases 4 involving the failure of
tion .... Any requests being telefaxed into the National Office should be submitted
four days prior to the anticipated equipment use.
(6) When emergency situations occur, the Director, or Acting Director, Internal
Security Division, or the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) will be contacted to
grant emergency approval to monitor. This emergency approval authority cannot be
redelegated. . . .Emergency authorizations pursuant to this exception will not be
given where the requesting official has in excess of 48 hours to obtain written advance
approval from the Attorney General.
440 U.S. at 744 n.4 (quoting Paragraph 652.22 of the IRS Manual which was in effect at the
time of the recording in January 1975).
7. Similar provisions are still in effect at Paragraph 9389.3 of the Manual. Consensual
Monitoring of Non-Telephone Conversations, [1980] 5 Irr. REv. MAN. (ADMINISTRATION)
(CCH) 28,225.
8. Caceres was indicted on three counts of bribing a public official pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976). Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 3-4. His first trial ended in a hung
jury. On remand to the district court, Caceres pleaded guilty to the charges. Conversation
with Linda Shostak, Attorney, Morrison and Foerster, San Francisco (Oct. 16, 1979).
9. During a March 1974 meeting with Dr. Caceres, Yee was offered a "personal settle-
ment" in exchange for a favorable resolution of the audit. Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at
20. Upon returning to his office, Yee prepared an affidavit describing the offer. Although he
continued to meet with Mrs. Caceres and their accountant, Yee did not meet with Dr. Caceres
again until January 27, 1975, when the offer was repeated. Yee subsequently arranged meet-
ings with Dr. Caceres for January 31, February 6, and February 11, each of which were re-
corded and monitored by other agents. During these meetings, Caceres gave Yee $1000 and
offered him an additional $2000 to ensure the favorable resolution of audits of his 1971, 1973,
and 1974 returns. 440 U.S. at 746-48.
10. "Emergency" approval was given to record the meetings on January 31 and February
6, 1975 because each request was submitted less than 24 hours before the meeting. The record-
ing of the February 11 meeting was done under the authority of a regular approval signed by a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 440 U.S. at 746-48.
11. United States v. Caceres, Criminal No. 76-129 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 10, 1975) (suppres-
sion order), reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 20a. The court also suppressed
the third tape on the ground that the IRS Manual prohibited approval of monitoring requests
by anyone below the rank of Assistant Attorney General. The request at issue was ultimately
approved by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Id at 18a. The court of appeals reversed
this ruling by holding that the lower court had misread the applicable regulations. United
States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1976).
12. 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976).
13. 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975).
14. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d
809 (4th Cir. 1970).
IRS agents to give Miranda-type warnings" prior to non-custodial
interviews with putative criminal defendants, as required by IRS
regulations". Disregarding the obvious fifth amendment right at
stake in the cases it was relying on,' 7 the court said, "By holding in
Sourapas that evidence obtained by IRS activity which did not sub-
stantially comply with its own regulations must be suppressed, we
placed no special emphasis upon the specific constitutional princi-
ples which underlay the regulatory scheme at issue."'" Although the
lower court failed to elaborate on the nature of the harm done to
Caceres, the court acknowledged its uncertainty upon denying the
Government's petition for rehearing:
Our decision today does not mean that in every instance a devia-
tion from general guidelines governing Executive exercises of dis-
cretion will result in the automatic exclusion of evidence ....
"We do not say that agencies always violate due process when
they fail to adhere to their procedures." Here, however, the non-
compliance by the IRS. .. harmed more than just the "efficiency
of I.R.S. operations."' 9
The Supreme Court reversed and found that the conceded vio-
lation of the procedure prescribed by the IRS Manual did not violate
any of Caceres' rights.2" The Court also declined to exercise its su-
pervisory power to exclude the recordings, reasoning that to do so
might discourage agencies from implementing protective regulations
not constitutionally or statutorily required.2 In addition, the agents
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although not required by, nor strictly con-
forming to, Miranda, the warning has been held to be sufficient under the circumstances of a
non-custodial interview in a taxpayer's residence. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976).
16. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. TREASURY DEPT., SPECIAL AGENTS HANDBOOK,
Paragraph 342.132, Non-Custodial Interviews, reprinted in [19801 5 INT. REV. MAN. (ADMINIS-
TRATION) (CCH) 28, 680-81.
17. The reviewing court had found in each case that the IRS, in order to protect taxpay-
ers' constitutional rights, had committed itself to more restrictive procedures than those re-
quired in Miranda. United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir.
1970). But see United States v. Fukushima, 373 F. Supp. 212 (D. Hawaii 1974) (dictum exten-
sively critiquing Leahey and Heffner, and, by implication, Sourapas).
18. 545 F.2d at 1187.
19. 545 F.2d at 1187 (quoting United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (lst Cir. 1970)).
20. 440 U.S. at 749-55 (1979). See Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.4. "Although the correct-
ness of the Ninth Circuit's holding that the IRS regulations were violated is not presented here
we note that that conclusion is far from apparent." As a matter of tactics, the Government
decided not to seek review of that factual holding. Conversation with Kenneth Geller, Attor-
ney, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 16, 1979). The footnote, however, presents the cogent argu-
ment that
[aipplication of the "emergency" exception should not depend on who proposes the
date of the recorded meeting. In any event, whatever the legitimacy of the rule...
in other circumstances, it has no application here, since nothing in the record suggests
that Agent Yee manipulated the timing of the two meetings in order to avoid seeking
Department of Justice approval.
Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.4.
21. 440 U.S. at 755. The regulation at issue was only "protective" insofar as it enabled
the IRS to guard against the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment to monitor conversa-
tions without the consent of any party. See notes 36, 41-43 and accompanying text infra
involved had believed in good faith that they were acting on the ba-
sis of legally granted authority.22
The regulation upon which Caceres based his motion to sup-
press is not required by either the Constitution or federal law. The
fourth amendment does not protect individuals against the recording
of their statements by those with whom they speak.23 Nor is such
conduct proscribed by federal law,24 which regulates only electronic
surveillance conducted without the consent of both parties to a con-
versation.25
The questions raised in the case were whether the IRS agents'
failure to secure proper approval for the recording violated Caceres'
rights to due process and equal protection under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment,26 and if not, whether the evidence
should be excluded on the basis of the Court's supervisory power
over the federal judicial system.27 Concurring with the Govern-
ment's position, the Court answered both questions in the negative.
The Supreme Court properly focused on the purpose of the reg-
ulation, accepting the Government's argument that the regulation
was primarily intended to enable the IRS to oversee the use of elec-
tronic surveillance equipment by IRS agents, and only incidentally
intended to protect the rights of taxpayers. 2  Thus, while it was true
22. 440 U.S. at 756-57.
23. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963).
24. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et
seq. (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
25. Id at § 2511(2)(c). Some states prohibit the interception or recording of conversa-
tions without the consent of all parties. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West Supp.
1980) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1335(4) (1979) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c). Caceres
argued below that the Government's violation of § 632(a) should operate to exclude all the
recordings the Government sought to introduce. The district court, however, rejected this con-
tention, citing United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
929 (1975) to the effect that evidence gathered in violation of a state law is admissible in
federal court, absent a violation of federal law or the Constitution. Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 17c. Accord, United States v. Vespe, 389 F. Supp. 1359, 1372 (D. Del.) a "dub
nom. United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1371-72 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1051 (1976). See FED. R. EvD. 402, reprinted in note 27 infr
26. The Court has charged the federal government with the duty of equal protection
through the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
27. The Court declined to consider the Government's challenge, based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1976) and Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to its supervisory power to
exclude the recordings. 440 U.S. at 755 n.22. A confession is defined as "any self-incriminat-
ing statement," and it "shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1976). "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution. . . ,by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EvID. 402. See Brief for Petitioner at 40-44
(citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.I I (1959). Unresolved in Caceres, this
issue was decided by the Court in United States v Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980). There, the
Court held that "the supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to suppess otherwise
admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before
the court." Id at 2446.
28. The Government argued,
There is no evidence that the regulations at issue here . . . were intended to grant
that Caceres did not receive the 'benefit" of proper approval of the
request to monitor, such a benefit was not intended to accrue directly
to him. Although the regulation was publicly available,29 Caceres
did not even know that his conversations were being recorded, much
less that the recordings were made in violation of the regulation.
Hence, he could not "reasonably contend that. . its breach had
any effect on his conduct.
30
The Court also observed that Caceres was treated no differently,
in substance, than others like him. Had the request for authority to
record the conversations been submitted earlier, it would certainly
have been approved in light of the crime involved and the rationale
for its subsequent approval. The inconsistency of treatment was
"purely one of form."31
In reaching its conclusions, the Court distinguished its holding
in Caceres from the contrary holdings of cases involving agency fail-
ures to follow their own procedural rules governing the conduct of
quasi-judicial proceedings. 32  That factual context, however, is
clearly unrelated to- the investigative work of the IRS agents at issue
in Caceres.33
Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that the failure of the
IRS to follow its own administrative rules violated none of Dr. Cace-
citizens protection against consensual electronic eavesdropping beyond those already
provided by the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act .... To the contrary, the procedures were designed primarily to
permit responsible government officials to control the actions of their subordinates in
an area of some sensitivity ....
Brief for Petitioner at 12. Indeed, no rights "protected" by the regulation were violated. See
notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra
Another rule in the IRS Manual prohibits non-consensual monitoring of any conversation
because investigations of tax violations are outside the scope of Title III, supra note 24, and
such monitoring may only be done pursuant to court order issued under the authority of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1976). Paragraph 9389.5, Non-Consensual Monitoring is Prohibited,
INT. REv. MAN., supra note 7 at 28,225-2 (1980).
29. See, e.g., note 7 supra.
30. 440 U.S. at 753. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), in which the Court held
that reliance on police advice that it was legal to demonstrate in a particular location pre-
cluded punishment for violation of a statute prohibiting demonstrations "near" courthouses.
But cf. Fed. Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (farmer not entitled to rely on
Government insurance agent's representation that was contrary to regulation having the force
and effect of law).
31. 440 U.S. at 752. By analogy, a warrantless search may nonetheless be reasonable.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
32. 440 U.S. at 751-55.
33. Eg., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (reversing contempt of Congress
convicti6n for failure to accord petitioner consideration of his request to testify in executive
session, as required by committee rules); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (reversing
denial of declaratory relief to petitioner discharged from the State Department in violation of
its regulations); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (habeas corpus proceeding reversing
INS deportation order because unsworn statements were admitted into evidence in violation of
INS regulations). Cf. Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (failure to notify party
of decision according to FCC's "usual practice" required agency to extend 30-day filing period
for petition for reconsideration, when the delay in notification was the dominant reason for
petitioner's late filing).
res' rights and, thus, the application of the exclusionary rule must
rest, if at all, on the Court's supervisory power. Refusing to exercise
that power, Justice Stevens suggested that the presence of internal
disciplinary sanctions,34 coupled with the agents' good faith attempt
at compliance with the regulation, negated the need for the rule's
deterrent effect. 3' Furthermore, an overbroad application of the ex-
clusionary rule might discourage agencies from fashioning protective
rules such as those at issue here. 36  Justice Stevens felt that "occa-
sional erroneous administration" of this kind could be tolerated.37
Writing in dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the majority
had misperceived the true purpose of the regulations. Examining
their legislative history, he found that they were originally promul-
gated in 1967 in response to congressional concern about the unau-
thorized use of eavesdropping techniques.3" Furthermore, he
argued, the regulations were intended to provide the kind of protec-
34. In his dissent, Justice Marshall maintained that the IRS's disciplinary procedures
were notoriously lax. He cited one group of 18 agents who "had engaged in 35 to 40 'instances'
of improper monitoring [in 1973], with an "instance"defined to include as many as 15 different
phone calls. None of these employees were dismissed or demoted. In only one case did viola-
tions ever actuate suspension." 440 U.S. at 767 n.9 (citation omitted).
35. The "good faith" doctrine rests on the premise that exclusion of evidence seized by
officers who genuinely believe the search to be constitutional serves no deterrent purpose.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). To date the doctrine has only been used to deny
exclusion in cases testing the retrospective application of a ruling that a particular practice or
ordinance is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Several members of the Court have argued that the
doctrine should be extended to situations in which an officer has acted "as a reasonable officer
would and should act in similar circumstances," but is later found to be in error by the court.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). See notes 48-50 and ac-
companying text infra. See also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment." The "Reasona-
able" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 649-56 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Ball].
36. This assertion is not well supported, as is demonstrated by the IRS's retention of the
rules in Caceres for more than two years after the Ninth Circuit's decision. Similarly, the rules
at issue in the Heofiner line of cases, supra note 13, are still in effect. See notes 11-15 and
accompanying text supra.
"In the wake of the Second Circuit's exclusion of evidence on the basis of noncompliance
with the prosecutorial custom of informing grand jury witnesses of their 'target' status, re-
straints have actually been strengthened." Brief for Respondent at 57-58 (referring to United
States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismised as impro videnty granted, 436 U.S.
31 (1978) (after re-argument)). Prior to Supreme Court review, the custom was incorporated
into the United States Attorney's Aanual. See Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regu-
lations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629, 649-50 (1974). But see F. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AND THE COURTS, 289-90 (1951).
Moreover, agencies that attempted to operate without procedural rules would likely run
afoul of the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process.
In addition, the rules in Caceres would not seem to be protective insofar as they applied to
Caceres. See note 21 supra
37. 440 U.S. at 756.
38. 440 U.S. at 760-62
Among the agency practices that the Subcommiteee found offensive was the monitor-
ing of certain conversations between taxpayers and IRS agents wired for sound. Of
more general concern was the agency's total failure to detect or disapprove violations
of its own internal rules . ..
. . . Both the scope of the new regulations and the IRS Commissioner's repre-
sentations to the Senate Subcommittee demonstrate that the agency was concerned
not only with preventing "violation[s] of a person's constitutional or statutory rights,"
tive procedural guarantees to taxpayers as did the regulations in
Bridges v. Wixon39 and Service v. Dulles.' This argument, however,
attempts to reach too far. The control of certain practices found "of-
fensive"41 by Congress or the public in the absence of constitutional
or statutory proscription, may reflect no more than an attempt to
curry favor among those groups or an intent to eliminate actual vio-
lations of taxpayers' rights.42 It is unlikely that the IRS wanted to
protect taxpayers from the violation of a right they were held in 1963
not to possess.43
The presence of internal discipline and the possibility that agen-
cies might be discouraged from fashioning protective rules such as
the one at issue in Caceres are factually questionable grounds for not
exercising the Court's supervisory power." The appearance of the
"good faith" rationale in Justice Stevens' opinion, however, is both
sound and significant. The rationale is factually sound because the
record did not reveal any intention to use the "emergency" provi-
sions to avoid Justice Department approval of questionable monitor-
ing activities.45 Furthermore, the rationale is philosophically sound
in view of the emergence of the deterrence rationale as the primary
justification for the exclusionary rule.' Officers who genuinely be-
lieve that their actions are constitutional will not be deterred by the
thought that the evidence they are gathering will be excluded.47
Significantly, Justice Stevens' use of the "good faith" rationale
but also with "carefully control[ling]" certain investigative technique which, "al-
though legal, nevertheless tend to be offensive to the public conscience."
Id at 761 (citation omitted).
39. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
40. 354 U.S. 363 (1957). See note 33 and accompanying text supra. It is ironic that Jus-
tice Marshall should attribute such good faith to the IRS in light of the practices he alluded to
(see note 38 supra) and the lack of disciplinary action that he deplored. (See note 34 supra.)
41. See note 38 supra.
42. For example, the IRS has no authority to monitor conversations without the consent
of any of the parties. See note 28 supra.
43. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963).
44. See notes 34 and 36 and accompanying text supra
45. "The agency action, while later found to be in violation of the regulations, nonethe-
less reflected a reasonable, good faith attempt to comply in a situation in which no one ques-
tions that monitoring was appropriate." 440 U.S. at 757. See note 20 supra
46. See note 3 supra. Although it had some early support, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961) (the "exclusion doctrine" is "an essential part of the right to privacy"), the
theory that the rule is the remedy for the violation of the defendant's rights has been conclu-
sively rejected. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (citing Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965), and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). Nor
has judicial integrity remained as an independent justification for the rule: "This rationale
• ..is really an assimilation of the more specific rationales [of deterrence and trustworthiness]
aand does not in their absence provide an independent basis for excluding challenged evi-
dence." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 n.25 (1974).
47. Ultimately, an officer's belief must be tested by its objective reasonableness, thus har-
monizing with the fourth amendment due process standard. "If, for example, the factors relied
on by the police. . . were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in
its existence entirely unreasonable .. " Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part). See Ball, supra note 35, at 655-56. A similar test has been adopted
by the ALI:
for the first time, albeit in a limited manner and as dictum, may be
evidence of a shifting attitude in the Court. If such a shift occurs the
rationale may be entirely adopted in the future by the Court in order
to avoid applying the exclusionary rule in cases "where the officer
acted as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circum-
stances, but where the courts have ultimately determined that in
their view the officer was mistaken."48 Four members of the Court
have already advocated a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule4 9 because, as Justice Burger has said, there has been no "clear
demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule [as] is required to justify it in view of the high price it extracts
from society - the release of countless guilty criminals."50 It is still
uncertain whether Justice Stevens will join Justices Burger, White,
Powell, and Rehnquist in adopting a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule in order to permit the introduction of relevant and
probative evidence in spite of fourth amendment violations.5 What
is certain, in view of the number of search and seizure cases being
appealed to the Court, is that he will have numerous opportunities to
do so.
In determining whether a violation.., is substantial, the court shall consider all the
circumstances including:
(a) the extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) the extent to which the violation was wilful;
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS290.2(4) (Official Draft
1975).
48. Ball, supra note 35, at 653. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-42 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
49. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J.,); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting). Refusing to adopt the exclusionary rule in New York, Justice Cardozo said, "The
criminal is to go free because the constable blundered." People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
51. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), in which Justice Stevens joined in
Justice Brennan's dissent, maintaining that the stop-and-identify ordinance under which
DeFillippo was arrested was clearly unconstitutional under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id at 46. The dissent further argued that the majority was in error to hold that drugs found in
the search incident to the arrest were admissible in the trial for possession of drugs on the basis
of the police officer's good faith reliance on the ordinance, which was declared unconstitu-
tional on appeal in the Michigan courts. People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d
921 (1978).
[Casenote by Charles M. Watkins]
